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In his speeches to the Valdai Discussion Club three years running in fall 2014 through 2016 (Valdai 
2014, 2015, 2016), President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation reiterated Russia’s refusal 
to accept as legitimate the post-Cold War international order.  In his view that order is simply a set 
of rules imposed by the West – to its advantage – that the United States and other Western states 
themselves often do not follow. For Russia, global order should be based on a multipolar system 
in which a Westphalian sense of absolute sovereignty prevails; the rules for international economic 
intercourse cannot continue to preference the West and legitimacy must be based on a system that 
empowers Russia and other emerging state actors.   
In other words, Russia continues to challenge the West-centric order that emerged after the 
collapse of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as its rhetoric and, especially, 
its actions over the past decade have increasingly made clear (Bodganov 2017). After a short hiatus 
following the collapse of the USSR, when Russia’s new leadership was apparently committed to 
joining the West and its institutions, this view of Russia and its place in the world has come to 
dominate the ruling political elite ever since Vladimir Putin emerged as president at the turn of the 
century.  Russian policy veered away from its short-lived collaborative Western orientation to a 
unilateralist approach based on the idea that Russia was not fully part of Europe or the West, but 
rather was a Eurasian state with its own culture and interests. 
 
The Emergence of the Post-Cold War International Order 
 
The focus of this article is on global governance in an era in which major new actors join those 
who have for the past quarter century, and longer, set the rules for what is termed the liberal 
international order. That order has been characterized by Western, especially U.S., political and 
economic dominance, the expansion of democratic political institutions and “open door” economic 
policies.1 These new actors – most prominently the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic 
of China – have begun to challenge the continuing dominant position of the United States and the 
West in determining what is and what is not acceptable behavior both domestically and 
internationally. 
The current international order is founded on a commitment to democratic political 
institutions and free trade in an increasingly open international market, as well as on the ban of 
																																								 																				
1 For an assessment of the more assertive Western policy of exporting its view of a stable international 
system see Sakwa (2015).   
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military aggression, the protection of the territorial integrity of states, and the sovereign right of 
non-interference. However, as Michael Boyle (2016) notes, the U.S. and Europe have in fact begun 
to “carve out a series of exceptions to these principles under the banner of the protection of human 
rights.” The Russians have been quick to point to what they view as Western hypocrisy in these 
areas and to use Western arguments in support of exceptions for their own purposes in justifying 
military interventions in both Ukraine and Syria. They maintain that the responsibility to protect 
argument can be used as a justification for regime change, in Abkhazia as in Libya; second, the 
cherry-picking orchestrated by the West in human rights and international law can no longer be 
justified by the UN Security Council (Boyle 2016, 50, 52).   
An extreme version of the U.S. conception of the global system was espoused by the Bush 
Administration in the period immediately following the terrorist attacks on Washington and New 
York in September 2001 and still attracts supporters in the United States. The so-called Bush 
Doctrine asserted U.S. global dominance and the moral right of the United States, alone if 
necessary, to use that dominance as it saw fit to protect its interests and those of like-minded states. 
The result was a split between the U.S. and many of its long-term allies and an exacerbation of the 
divisions in U.S.-Russian relations.2  Only with the Obama Administration and its less assertive 
approach to U.S. relations with the rest of the world, was there an improvement, albeit very short-
lived, in relations with the Russian Federation. Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine 
and the absorption of Crimea in early 2014 led to further deterioration of relations between the 
Russian Federation and the West. 
 
The Russian Challenge to the Existing International Order 
 
The single clearest message presented by Vladimir Putin since his rise to the presidency has 
concerned the continued greatness of Russia and his commitment to ensuring that Russia was once 
again viewed by others as the dominant power in post-Soviet space, in Eurasia, and an equal to 
other Great Powers in determining global affairs.  Sometime about 2005 – after the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq, the expansion of both NATO and EU into Central Europe and the Baltics, the 
announcement of the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood Policy,3 and the widespread support for the color 
revolutions in several post-Soviet states that brought down governments closely allied to Moscow4 
– the Russian leadership seems to have come to the decision that the prospects were bleak, if not 
non-existent, for Russia’s being accepted as an equal by the West and Russia’s interests being 
accepted as legitimate by the West. Almost immediately, this policy shift resulted in a serious 
deterioration of relations with the West. The charges at the Munich security conference already in 
early 2007 that the United States and NATO represented growing threats to Russia’s and the 
world’s security, the gas wars with Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, and the invasion of Georgia in 2008 
were all examples of this growing confrontation. 
This shift in Russian attitudes toward the West and the decision largely to abandon efforts 
to work with the West have underlain Moscow’s growing multiple-level  challenge to the 
international order – at the diplomatic level with its major efforts to influence the policies of the 
																																								 																				
2 For discussions of the Bush Doctrine and its contributions to instability in the international system, 
including to the deterioration of relations with Russia, see Kanet (2005). 
3 On the EU’s attempt to extend its norms and values eastward via the Eastern Neighborhood Policy see 
Casier (2012). 
4 On Western support for the color revolutions, including that of Western NGOs, see Stent (2014, pp. 101–
106). 
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BRICS states to challenge the Westcentric system; at the political and security level with the use 
of the tools of coercive diplomacy against neighboring states as a means, among other goals, of 
directly challenging Western-imposed norms and Western interests.   
 
Russia, the BRICS and the Challenge to the Existing Global Order 
 
As noted, for the past decade Russia has increasingly challenged the West and the existing 
international order across a broad set of fronts. These actions have ranged from rhetorical 
challenges to the global system to the use of military intervention meant to impose its policy 
objectives on other states, as well as cyber-attacks on national elections and direct support for 
right-wing political groups in the West seemingly meant to instill instability within the member 
states of the Western community and to challenge the very existence of that community itself. The 
rhetorical challenges themselves have included the shifts in stated policy objectives noted above. 
In addition, verbal attacks on the United States, NATO and the European Union have become more 
persistent and more vitriolic over the years, as has the Russian effort to develop alternative 
competing definitions for terms such as “democracy” that challenge Western conceptions of 
democratic governance. For example, in a speech presented to the Russian Parliament in 2005, he 
called the collapse of the USSR the greatest political disaster of the twentieth century (President’s 
Speech 2005).  Little more than a year later at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Putin 
presented an attack on the US and the West and announced that Russia was back as a major 
international actor and would not follow the lead of the West in terms of security and foreign 
policy issues. He also stated that Russia saw itself in conflict with the West and asserted that it 
was not bound by the Western definition of democracy and that it was trying to establish a 
‘sovereign democracy’ that would be independent from external influence (Petrov and McFaul 
2005; Herd 2009). The implementation of “sovereign democracy” as a form of governance is part 
of a major element of Russia’s soft power project designed to challenge the Euro–Atlantic status 
quo and demonstrate that Russia is unique and just as legitimate as the US or Europe (Stent 2014, 
142–43). 
Besides challenging Western policy norms and presenting alternative views, Russia has 
attempted to initiate structural changes in the system.  Soon after the Russo-Georgian war in 
August 2008, then President Medvedev proposed a major change in the security environment 
across all of Europe and Eurasia – one based on quite different assumptions from the existing 
system (Lomagin 2012; Fernandes 2012). The fact that the proposals came after the Russo-
Georgian war and at the time that Russia was expanding the proposed role of its military in the 
pursuit of foreign policy objectives ensured that they would never be seriously considered by the 
West (Kanet 2010). 
Another more recent effort by Russia to accomplish some of its objectives through 
institutional means resulted within the BRICS movement of the call for alternative institutions and 
programs aimed at reducing, even avoiding, dependence on Western-dominated institutions such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.5  This effort has been complemented by 
the campaign to create the Eurasian Economic Union, which is meant to forge an economic union 
in former Soviet space that will strengthen Russia’s influence within that space. 
One of the very few positive results for Moscow of the Western sanctions imposed on it 
by the West after its military incursion into Ukraine and absorption of Crimea has been its greatly 
																																								 																				
5 For the efforts of the BRICS states to influence structural elements of the international system and the 
leading role that Russia has attempted to play in influencing those efforts, see Armijo and Roberts (2014).  
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expanded role in several multinational groups, notably BRICS, where it served as chair during the 
year 2015. Ahead of meetings in Ufa, President Putin called for this group to move away from 
dependence on the international monetary order that depends on the US dollar. The member 
countries agreed to abandon the dollar and the euro in the US $500 billion trade among themselves, 
thereby escaping the rules and regulations imposed by the West on the international system. 
Coincidently, in 2015 Russia also chaired the Collective Security Organization (CSO), which 
includes China and a number of other Asian states. With the de facto admission of both India and 
Pakistan to the organization, the CSO has, in effect, placed itself in a much improved position to 
influence political and security developments in South Asia at a time when it appears that the 
United States is likely to withdraw from the level of involvement in the region that it has had in 
the past (Ufa 2015). 
 
Russia, Regional Integration and the Challenge to the Existing Global Order  
 
Russia’s major institutional challenge to the existing international order has probably been the 
campaign to develop the Eurasian Economic Union. Beginning during Putin’s 2011 presidential 
election campaign, this initiative is meant to challenge the applicability of global norms as they 
might apply to a group of states of which Russia is but one. In this case, it applies to post-Soviet 
space, in order to counter what Moscow has viewed as an “assault” on its interests in that region, 
especially that east of the Urals. The purpose of the Union is to integrate the economies of former 
Soviet states into a Moscow-centered organization that would supposedly contribute to the 
modernization and economic expansion of the member countries.  Crucial for the success of the 
proposal would be the membership of Ukraine, which has the largest economy by far after Russia’s 
among the potential members. This brought Russian policy directly into conflict with the 
Neighborhood Policy of the European Union in both Ukraine and Armenia, both of which the EU 
was courting for special relationships that, de facto¸ were exclusive and would have precluded 
those countries committing themselves to any integration project with Russia and the Eurasian 
Union (Casier 2016). 
Although Ukraine had seemingly committed itself to an Association Agreement with the 
European Union, in fall 2013 President Yanukovych announced that Ukraine would sign a 
strategic partnership agreement with Russia rather than that with the EU.  The result was 
widespread domestic opposition that led eventually to Yanukovych’s flight from the country in 
February 2014 and the election of a new, Western-oriented government and to Russian military 
intervention, including the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation and support for 
the ongoing secessionist efforts in Eastern Ukraine.  It was these actions by the Russian 
government that led to a broad range of economic sanctions imposed on Moscow by the United 
States and the European Union and to the continuing deterioration of relations. 
Russia has relied very heavily on economic coercion of the type that many have described 
in the past (e.g., Nygren 2008) in generating support for the EEC. Of the six East European and 
Caucasian countries that both the European Union and Russia have targeted for closer ties in recent 
years three have gravitated to each side. Geographic location, including isolation from the Russian 
Federation, has probably been a determining factor in the case of Moldova’s opting for closer ties 
to the EU.  For Azerbaijan the oil and gas boom and relative economic independence from Russia 
has been of central importance in permitting the leadership to pursue an independent path, as the 
close political relationship with the United States and NATO Georgia has maintained over the past 
decade has enable Tbilisi to tie itself more closely to the European Union.    
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The relevant point here is the fact that for the better part of the past decade Russia has 
systematically used economic, political and security pressures – along with various regional 
institutional developments – as instruments to challenge the existing international system and to 
draw other states away from that system and closer to itself.  Its appeals have been political in 
nature to those who find Western demands to replicate Western norms and values; they have been 
based on the attempts to build institutional ties outside the purview of Western control.  They have 
also involved economic pressures to raise the costs for those states that decide to ignore Russian 
policy preferences, as well as military threats as we will discuss in the next section of this paper. 
 
Russia, Coercive Diplomacy and the Challenge to the Existing Global Order 
 
When Bertil Nygren (2008) wrote a decade ago about the increasing pressure that Moscow put on 
its near neighbors to “guide” them toward policies in line with the former’s interests, he focused 
almost exclusively on the “power of the purse” and on “pipeline politics” – examples of Russia’s 
use of the economic dependence of most other post-Soviet states on Russia for their economic 
well-being. This was especially true in the case of energy dependence in Belarus, Ukraine, 
Georgia, and Armenia. Until the time of the first color revolutions in the years 2003-2005, Russia 
was willing to negotiate its economic and political differences with “near abroad” states and to 
accept the disadvantageous economic relationships that often existed.  In return, they were 
generally able to work out political differences with likeminded semi-authoritarian regimes in 
Kyiv, Minsk and Tbilisi.  However, with the uprisings associated with the color revolutions and 
the coming to power in some of these states governments desirous of distancing themselves from 
dependence on Moscow and tying themselves more closely to the European Union and to NATO, 
such pragmatic relationships became much more difficult for Moscow. 
Many other analysts have also tracked the importance of economic instruments and “soft 
power” in Russia’s efforts to accomplish its foreign policy objectives, especially those related to 
the attempt to hold other CIS states in line in what has become an increasingly competitive 
relationship with the West.  Nikita Lomagin (2017) has pointed out that for “President Putin 
management of the economic agenda became a central component of Moscow’s relations with the 
international community and its outlook on the world.” He concludes, however, that Russia’s 
overall position in this type of economic “warfare” is not a strong one, because of the 
overdependence of its financial and energy sectors on the West.   
 Besides exerting economic pressure on neighboring states in the effort to accomplish 
foreign policy goals, often precisely to tie them more closely to Russia and to assert Russia’s status 
as the dominant power in the region in the competition with the West, Russia has also employed 
both the threat of the use of military power and military power itself – most notably in the war 
with Georgia in 2008 and with Ukraine since the confrontation in winter 2013-14.   
Although Russia was willing to use military capabilities to achieve goals in the immediate 
post-Soviet years, according to Stanislav Tkachenko (2017) it was really not until the confrontation 
with Georgia and more recent concerns about Ukraine that Moscow developed a coordinated 
approach to the use of threats and actual military force to achieve policy objectives.  This has 
required a rebuilding of Russian military capabilities especially in the years following the Russo-
Georgian war and limiting the use of military power so that it does not challenge the foundations 
of the current security order, even though it might challenge portions of that order.  This is exactly 
what occurred in the cases of Russian military involvement in Georgia, Ukraine and, most recently, 
in Syria.  In all of these cases, Moscow has challenged the existing order, that preferred by the 
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United States and the West.  However, in all these cases, Russia has limited its involvement so as 
not to run the risk of direct confrontation with the West. 
 As Tkachenko (2017) notes, the initial goals of Russia’s coercive diplomacy have been 
simple – “[i]n Syria, the aim is to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power and to stop the 
epidemic of ‘the Arab Spring.’ In Ukraine, Russia is looking for a neutral status of this country as 
well as for leaders who will be supportive of the strategic interests of Russia and independent from 
U.S. pressure.” Once these objectives have been met the goal is to move to the level of negotiating 
a longer-term settlement. Such a policy requires that the majority of the population support the 
policy and that the risk of failure is low, as was the case in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine, Crimea 
and Syria more recently. 
 
President Donald Trump, the Russian Federation and the Future of the Liberal Global 
Order 
 
Among analysts of the current global economic, political and security order there is general 
agreement that without the central role of the United States in stabilizing the system, it is likely to 
erode, or even collapse. Riccardo	 Alcaro	 of	 the	 Istituto	 Affari	 Internazionali	 (IAI)	 and	 the	 Brookings	
Institution has pointed out: 
 
To conclude, the liberal order is challenged and less capable of functioning than in 
the past. Yet, its pillars – Western power and the liberal discourse – are far from 
collapse. Western power is in relative decline, but no country in the world, not even 
China, has the ability (or the willingness, for that matter) to replace the fundamental 
role played by the US as ultimate guarantor of international security. Even if it so 
willed, China would lack the influence the US derives from the liberal discourse, 
which might have lost relevance but continues to be faced with a lack of valid 
alternatives. Governance within the current system is more complicated, but not 
structurally impossible (Alcaro 2015).6 
 
As we have argued in this article, Mr. Putin and the Russian leadership around him are 
fully committed to undermining and replacing the current liberal world order that has been crafted 
by the United States and its major allies in fits and starts over the course of the past several 
generations – to meet its own interests and goals. Russia’s efforts to redefine the existing world 
order and to reduce the dominant position of the United States in defining and maintaining that 
order seems to have gained an important new ally in Donald Trump and those around him in the 
White House and in control of the U.S. Congress.  The latter seem to question the very foundations 
of that order and to call for the United States’ withdrawal from it. President Trump’s questioning 
of the continued relevance of NATO, his opposition to multilateral trade agreements and to 
multilateral organizations in general, and the “costs” associated with the leadership role that the 
U.S. has undertaken in establishing a global system based on rules and institutions that the U.S. 
itself has found beneficial to its own interests, even if the financial costs associated with that 
																																								 																				
6 Given the statements of Donald Trump and key members of his administration and the initial policies that 
the new Administration appears to be pursuing, analysts and political leaders across the world question the 
willingness, commitment and ability of the United States government to project the kind of influence that it 
has had because of its commitment to a liberal discourse for much of the past half century (Rubin, 2017). 
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leadership role are carried disproportionately by the United States.7 Trump appears to prefer an 
international system based primarily on bilateral relationships, as do Mr. Putin and his associates 
in Moscow. This, added to the rise of nationalist movements across much of Europe, does not 
augur well for the future of the existing international order, or for the relative stability that that 
order has brought with it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
7 In a brief essay on President Trump’s “America First” policy The Economist notes that 
 
multinational institutions such as the UN, World Trade Organisation, IMF and World 
Bank may occasionally constrain America, but overall they enhance its influence. . . . 
Uncle Sam foots a disproportionate part of the bills. Yet this has also given America 
exceptional sway over global rules governing everything from trade to security.  Walk 
away, and the result will not be a better deal.  It will be China first and America’s allies 
diminished; not peace through strength so much as weakness somehow conjured out of 
primacy (“China First,” 2017). 
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